We develop a theoretical framework to investigate the impact of patent policies and emission taxes on green innovation that reduces the emission output ratio, and on the emission level. In the absence of green consumers, the introduction of patents results in a paradox whereby increasing emission tax beyond a certain threshold leads to a discrete increase in the emission level, which may be avoided by reducing the patenting cost. In the presence of green consumers, this paradox is restricted to an intermediate range of tax rates, and at su¢ ciently high tax rates, reducing the patenting cost may increase the emission level.
Given increasing environmental concerns and the increasing environmental consciousness of citizens globally, developing green technologies has become a key policy initiative of international organizations such as the UN and the G8, and of national governments. 1 Within this context, we examine the interaction of patent policies and environmental regulation in enhancing innovation in "green", or less polluting, production technologies, and in reducing the emission of pollutants. Studying patent policies for the development of green technologies requires a spe-ci…c analysis due to potential interactions between knowledge and environmental externalities caused by the innovators. We thus develop a theoretical framework to investigate the impact of changing patentability requirements and patenting costs in conjunction with increasing emission taxes, allowing for the presence of environmental friendly consumers. This paper builds upon existing results in the literatures on the development of green technologies, on patents, and on the environmentally friendly behaviour of consumers.
The literature on green technologies is rapidly evolving in response to global environmental problems such as climate change. Climate experts propose that the increase in average global temperature should be restricted to about 2 C to avoid the possibility of catastrophic damage, a goal that may only be reached by developing and implementing "breakthrough" technologies that reduce emissions dramatically (Barrett, 2009; Galiana and Green, 2009) . One stream of the literature has evolved around the seminal work of Porter (1991) and Porter and van der Linde (1995) , referred to as the Porter Hypothesis, and examines whether the implementation of stricter environmental regulations increases …rms'incentives to invest in green Research and Development (R&D). The empirical evidence surrounding the Porter Hypothesis is mixed (Ambec et al., 2013) . Our paper is more closely related to a second stream of the literature, which argues 1 In 2016, the Canadian federal government announced that it will invest $200 million annually to create sector speci…c strategies to support the development of clean technologies and invest $100 million annually in organizations that support clean technology …rms such as Sustainable Development Technology Canada. In the U.S., the Department of Energy's Loan Program O¢ ce has more than $40 billion in remaining loans to help …nance innovative technologies that can reduce carbon emissions. In Canada and the U.S. respectively, about 2500 and 18500 patents for green technologies are issued annually.
Policy makers use di¤erent means to reduce these patenting costs. One such method which has been frequently used is fast-tracking, or expediting the review process, of green patent applications. This is a key policy initiative undertaken by several countries including Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, UK, U.S., Japan and Korea. Given that the time from application to grant has been e¤ectively reduced by up to 75% for patents entering the fast track procedure and that evidence shows that fast-tracking programs have accelerated the di¤usion of knowledge in green technologies in the short run (Dechezleprêtre, 2013) , such policies are likely to continue and proliferate. In our model, we introduce a lump sum cost associated with obtaining and implementing patents, and examine the impact of lowering this cost.
We also analyze the impact of changing another aspect of patent policy, that is, patentability requirements. In order to be patentable an innovation must be su¢ ciently novel (not already in the public domain), non-obvious (to a person with ordinary skills in the particular …eld), and useful (to have at least one application). The relevant requirements vary across jurisdictions and are currently stricter in the EU than in the U.S. (Eckert and Langinier, 2014) . In the spirit of Crampes and Langinier (2009) , we model the patentability requirement as a minimum investment threshold level that must be satis…ed. We then vary this investment threshold to examine whether a stricter patentability requirement fosters more green innovation. 7 We also contribute to the green innovation literature by incorporating environmentally friendly consumers in our model. The increasing environmental consciousness of citizens globally is re ‡ected in widely used eco-labeling schemes internationally. 8 A few papers study optimal …nal disposition. 7 Some studies have illustrated that strong Intellectual Property Rights may not necessarily enhance innovation (Green and Scotchmer, 1995; Gallini, 2002; Bessen and Maskin, 2009) . Even though in a static world (single innovation), patents of appropriate scope can encourage innovations (Klemperer, 1990; Gilbert and Shapiro, 1990) , this is no longer the case when the cumulative nature of innovation is accounted for. In the case of cumulative innovations, strict patentability requirement may even discourage follow-on innovations (Scotchmer, 1991) . The prospect of being imitated inhibits inventors in a static world but, in a dynamic world, imitators can bene…t both the original inventor and society (Bessen and Maskin, 2009 ). In our paper, we abstract away from these issues and present an alternative mechanism through which stronger patentability requirements a¤ect innovation. 8 For example, in countries like Sweden about 50% of the market share for certain products consists of the environmental policies in the presence of environmentally friendly consumers, but they do not address green innovation (Arora and Gangopadhyay, 1995; Cremer and Thisse, 1999; Moraga-Gonzalez and Padron-Fumero, 2002; Bansal and Gangopadhyay, 2003; Lombardini-Riipinen, 2005; Bansal, 2008) . It is important to include environmentally friendly consumers since this might modify the role of emission taxes in inducing innovation. This is because, as the product becomes cleaner, the green conscious consumers demand more of it thereby mitigating the e¤ect of emission taxes in reducing emissions. 9;10 Our model is applicable to a wide variety of products, the production processes of which are becoming cleaner. Consider for example, products such as toys, furniture and packaging, the "greenness"of which may depend on the proportion of inputs used in the production process that are recycled. Recent evidence suggests that the volume of recycling has been increasing. 11 Hence the importance of analyzing how behavioural responses of environmentally friendly consumers to such cleaner production processes that generate the "rebound-like e¤ect" in our model, a¤ect the functioning of policies such as emission taxes and environmentally friendly variant. Green marketing is also frequently used to in ‡uence consumer behavior in transportation and electricity markets (Kraftborsen, 2001) . 9 This is reminiscent of the "rebound e¤ect" whereby as a product becomes more energy e¢ cient, demand for the product increases (see Gillingham et al., 2016 , for a survey). At the same time, we note that the channel through which the demand increases in our model is di¤erent from the rebound e¤ect that is discussed in the energy e¢ ciency literature. While in the latter, the increase in demand results from improved energy e¢ ciency reducing the price of the good or the price of using the good, the "rebound-like e¤ect" in our model is driven by environmentally friendly behaviour of consumers. 1 0 Another di¤erence between the rebound e¤ect that is discussed in the energy e¢ ciency literature, and the "rebound-like e¤ect" in our model is that while the former is applicable to scenarios where innovation leads to a cleaner consumption process, our model is applicable to scenarios where innovation leads to a cleaner production process associated with a given product. For example, replacing a gasoline powered vehicle with a hybrid car reduces the pollution externality related to the consumption of the good (in this case, the pollution arising from driving). This paper, on the other hand, focuses on the case where the production process of the good causes less pollution. By focusing on the production related pollution externalities, rather than consumption related ones, we abstract away from cases where increasing demand caused by the availability of a cleaner product leads to less pollution, as when a gasoline powered vehicle is replaced by a consumer with a hybrid car. patents for green innovation. 12 We model the market for a product, the production of which causes pollution. We assume that the implementation of a cleaner technology results in a lower emission per unit of output ratio (similar to, for example, Ray Chaudhuri, 2014, 2015) . Moreover, similar to Bansal and Gangopadhyay (2003) and Ibañez and Grolleau (2008) , we assume that the product is vertically di¤erentiated in terms of its emission-output ratio with green conscious consumers preferring products with lower emission-output ratios. On the demand side, we allow consumers to be heterogeneous in terms of their degree of environmental friendliness. Our framework has two stages where, in the …rst stage, an incumbent monopolist decides its level of investment in R&D, and in the second stage, it chooses the price of its product. The monopolist faces potential entry if it does not innovate. We assume that investment by the …rm reduces the emission-output ratio. If the innovation is patented, the …rm e¤ectively behaves as a monopolist when setting its price in the second stage. If the innovation does not satisfy the patentability requirement, the …rm cannot patent it and faces Bertrand competition in the second stage since entry occurs and rival …rms are assumed to have free access to the new technology.
Within this setting, our main …ndings are two-fold.
The …rst set of results shows that, in the absence of green consumers, the introduction of patents may result in a paradoxical result whereby increasing the emission tax beyond a certain threshold makes the innovation unpro…table, and thereby leads to a discrete increase in the emission level. By introducing a …xed cost of obtaining patents, we obtain that increasing the emission tax beyond a certain threshold makes the innovation unpro…table. At this tax threshold, without the innovation, the emission level increases discretely to the competitive emission level, causing the paradox. Reducing the patenting cost, e.g., by fast-tracking green patents, decreases the likelihood that this paradox occurs. In the presence of green consumers, this paradox occurs only within an intermediate range of tax rates. This is because, at very 1 2 The rebound e¤ect as captured in the existing energy e¢ ciency literature is an important phenomenon.
Although the "rebound-like e¤ect" that we capture in our model has not yet received as much attention in the existing literature as the traditional rebound e¤ect, given its potential empirical relevance, it is useful to examine its policy implications.
high tax rates, the emission level in the competitive equilibrium that occurs in the absence of innovation, is lower than that with innovation. If innovation occurred, demand from green consumers would increase thereby increasing the emission level above that in the competitive case without innovation. Thus, at very high tax rates, a lower emission level is reached despite a tax increase that makes the innovation unpro…table. It follows that, at su¢ ciently high tax rates, reducing patenting costs in order to induce innovation ends up increasing the emission level in the presence of green consumers. The lowest level of emissions, in the presence of green consumers, is therefore reached with very high emission tax rates combined with high patenting costs.
The second set of results shows that the traditional policy tools of increasing green investment and thereby reducing emissions through stricter emission taxes and patentability requirements may become less e¤ective as society becomes more environmentally friendly, with consumers rewarding marginal reductions in emission-ouput ratios of production processes. More speci…cally, while for a su¢ ciently small fraction of green consumers we retrieve the expected result found in much of the literature surrounding the Porter hypothesis that a higher emission tax increases green investment, this result is reversed if the fraction of green consumers rises to a level such that investment in green technologies results in more emissions. These results are driven by the "rebound-like" e¤ect introduced by the green consumers. We also show that a stricter patentability requirement is only e¤ective at reducing emissions as long as the fraction of green consumers is su¢ ciently small. Finally, we show that as long as the fraction of green conscious consumers is su¢ ciently low, the …rm underinvests relative to the socially optimal level for a su¢ ciently low emission tax and overinvests for a su¢ ciently high emission tax. However, the gap between the socially e¢ cient and privately optimal levels of investment steadily reduces as the fraction of green conscious consumers increases, until this result is reversed when this fraction becomes su¢ ciently large. Thus, further research seems warranted regarding the policies to reduce emissions through green innovation and also regarding the type of information to distribute to consumers.
We extend our analysis to a duopoly setting, where a single …rm decides to invest in a cleaner technology and patent its innovation in order to attract green consumers. Our results in the duopoly setting remain qualitatively similar to those derived in the monopoly setting.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present our model. In Section 3, we present the benchmark case without green consumers. In Section 4, we derive the equilibrium and policy implications for the case with green consumers. Section 5 presents an extension of the model with a duopoly case. Section 6 presents our concluding remarks. All proofs have been relegated to Appendices 1 and 2.
The Model
We consider a two-stage model in which a …rm sells a …nal good to consumers in a competitive market, the production of which is polluting and has a marginal cost, c. The emission of the pollutant generated per unit of production is given by:
where e denotes emission and q denotes output. The …rm can invest I G to reduce the emissionoutput ratio, . Thus, is a function of I G ; where (I G ) is such that 0 (I G ) < 0; 00 (I G ) > 0;
(0) = H and lim
The higher is I G , the greener the product. For notational convenience, henceforth we do not mention the argument of the function .
The demand side
The demand side consists of a continuum of N consumers. Each of them buys either 0 or 1 unit of the good. There exists a fraction of 'green conscious'consumers, whose utility is increasing in the "greenness" of the product, that is, decreasing in , and a fraction (1 ) of 'non-green conscious'consumers, whose utility is independent of the greenness of the product.
Let G denote the degree of environmental friendliness of a consumer, with G being uniformly distributed over the interval G; G with G > 0. We assume that consumers can observe how green a product is. Within this context, this is equivalent to assuming that consumers can observe . 13 We normalize N such that N = 1; and assume that G G = 1. Let P (e) denote 1 3 This is a relevant scenario to consider in the presence of e¤ective eco-labeling programs.
the pollution damage to each consumer, which is a function of total emissions, e. Following Ibañez and Grolleau (2008), we assume that the pollution level generated by total production is exogenous to each consumer, regardless of his consumption level. Let p denote the product price.
A green conscious consumer has the following utility function:
: v G p P (e) from buying the product P (e) from not buying (2) The term G in (2) re ‡ects that the greener the product, that is, the lower is , the better o¤ the green conscious consumer. Also, v represents the gross utility of consuming one unit of the good. A green conscious consumer does not buy the product if v G p < 0:
A non-green conscious consumer has the following utility function:
: v p P (e) from buying the product P (e) from not buying
Henceforth, we assume that P (e) = e.
From (3), it follows that a non-green conscious consumer buys the good as long as v p:
Therefore, if v < p, neither non-green conscious consumers nor green conscious consumers buy the good. If p = v, only non-green conscious consumers buy the good. When p < v, nongreen conscious consumers always buy the good whereas a green conscious consumer with a degree of environmental friendliness G buys the good as long as v G p 0. There exists a green conscious consumer e G who is indi¤erent between buying the good or not such that v e G p P (e) = P (e) or e G = (v p)= . As long as G < e G < G; some, but not all, green conscious consumers buy the good. Thus, it follows that the demand function, D (p) ; is given by:
Policy Tools
We consider a combination of policy tools. On the R&D side, we model a patenting policy for green innovations. On the environmental side, we assume that the …rm must pay a tax, ; per unit of emission: Thus, the tax bill faced by the …rm is given by D(p); where, by (1), D(p)
represents the emissions generated by the …rm.
The patent policy is such that the …rm must discover a su¢ ciently novel innovation to be able to obtain a patent. We assume that novelty of the innovation is increasing in the investment level.
Recall that 0 (I G ) < 0, such that a higher investment level reduces the emission-output ratio.
Thus, there exists a threshold P ; corresponding to investment level I P G ; where L < P < H ;
such that a patent is only granted if an innovation reduces below P : 14 Therefore, the …rm must invest I G I P G in order to ensure that P . We consider weak and strong patentability requirements, representing di¤erent levels of I P G ; as de…ned in Section 4.3 by De…nition 1.
In order to obtain a patent, the …rm must also incur an exogenously given cost C P G ; which is broadly de…ned to include a monetary fee payable by the …rm to the patent o¢ ce, the opportunity cost in terms of lost pro…ts incurred while waiting for the patent to be granted, as well potential litigation costs for enforcing the patent. There are several ways in which policy makers may reduce C P G ; including by implementing a fast-track patent system for green technologies that reduces the patent application processing time for green innovations.
Once a patent is granted and the …rm starts producing at a lower emission output ratio, this lower value of P becomes the new technology standard for the industry that is enforced by regulators. That is, we implicitly assume that no rival …rm can enter the industry if its production results in a higher : If the innovation does not satisfy the relevant patentability requirements, the …rm cannot patent it, and faces Bertrand competition in the second stage.
We note that such technology-based standards are widely used for environmental regulation. 15 1 4 We implicitly assume that the novelty of the innovation is assessed by an experienced patent examiner who is able to evaluate whether the innovation meets the patentability requirement. 1 5 For example, in Germany technology standards were used to reduce sulphur-dioxide emissions. In Canada, under the Canadian Enviromental Protection Act, technology standards apply to a number of industries including the energy sector, pulp and paper mills, and mineral smelters.
Moreover, technology standards are widely used as a trade barrier to keep foreign competition out of domestic markets. 16 In order to implement technology standards, the regulator prescribes certain technologies, design standards, engineering standards or input standards which require potential polluters to use inputs and production processes meeting speci…c conditions. Typically, technology standards specify that polluters use the "best available technology"(BAT), 17 implying that, subsequent to an innovation which improves the best available technology in a given industry regulated by technology standards, …rms with dirtier technologies would be unable to enter the industry.
Timing
The timing of the game is as follows. There are two stages. In the …rst stage of the game, the …rm decides the level of investment in the green technology, I G . 18 Once an innovation has been discovered, the …rm decides whether to patent it. 19 In the second stage, the …rm chooses the price of the product it o¤ers, p:
We solve for the equilibrium investment level and price through backward induction. For a given level of investment, we …rst determine the pricing strategy of the …rm. Then, we determine the level of investment at the equilibrium.
As a benchmark case, we …rst consider the scenario where there exist only non-green conscious consumers (i.e., = 0) in Section 3. Next, we enrich our analysis by considering that both green and non-green conscious consumers exist (i.e., 0 < 1), in Section 4.
1 6 For further details, please refer to: https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accordscommerciaux/topics-domaines/goods-produits/barriers.aspx?lang=eng 1 7 For further details, please refer to Field and Olewiler (2011). 1 8 An alternate interpretation of the investment level, IG, in our model is that it represents the cost incurred by the …rm for obtaining the innovation. 1 9 We make the simplifying assumption that an innovation will be discovered with probability 1. If we alternatively assumed that an innovation will be discovered with an exogenously given probability less than 1, this would make the notation and analysis more cumbersome without generating any new insights.
Benchmark Case: Non-Green Conscious Consumers
In this section, we present the scenario without any green consumers, that is, = 0: In the second stage, we have monopoly pricing, whereby the pro…t maximizing price is given by p = v:
From (4) ; it follows that, for = 0; the demand is given by D = 1. Thus, the emission level is
given by e = (I G ) ; and the pro…t is given by (v c ). Recall that c denotes the marginal cost of production.
In the …rst stage, the …rm's optimization problem is given by:
Let I N G be the solution of the unconstrained program (i.e., 0 (I N G ) = 1); the …rm therefore chooses the optimal investment I N G G = maxfI N G ; I P G g. As long as the unconstrained investment is large enough (I N G > I P G ) so that the …rm optimally chooses to reduce its emission-output ratio su¢ ciently, it is not constrained by the patentability requirement. However, if I N G < I P G , in order to patent its innovation, the …rm has to increase its investment to I P G , which is beyond its unconstrained optimal investment.
The unconstrained optimization investment level I N G is increasing with the tax so that the emission level is decreasing. However, for very low values of (in the extreme case if = 0), the …rm has very little (no) incentive to invest, so that 0 I N G < I P G is always satis…ed.
Consider two threshold levels of emission tax,^ 1 and^ 2 ; such that P = e I N G (^ 1 ) and
Our …rst set of …ndings concerning the emission level is summarized in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 The emission level, with = 0 (i) is given by P for 2 [0;^ 1 );
(ii) decreases due to marginal increases in the tax rate at any 2 [^ 1 ;^ 2 );
(iii) increases discretely due to an increase in the tax rate from any <^ 2 to any >^ 2 :
The …ndings listed in Proposition 1 are illustrated in Figure 1 below (see Appendix 1 for the explanation regarding the shapes of the functions in all the …gures). For a su¢ ciently low tax rate, that is, 2 [0;^ 1 ); the …rm invests the minimum amount required to obtain a patent, that is,
, the …rm has an incentive to invest more than this minimum level since I N G < P . We note that the …rm only invests as long
which is not satis…ed for >^ 2 : Thus, for >^ 2 , the …rm does not invest and Bertrand competition results in emission level given by e c = H :
Proposition 1 highlights the …rst contribution of our paper, which is to show that the introduction of patents may result in a paradoxical result whereby increasing the emission tax beyond a certain threshold leads to a discrete increase in the emission level. Moreover, it follows from (5) that the higher the patenting cost, C P G ; the greater the range of taxes for which the paradox occurs.
Corollary 1 The lower the patenting cost, C P G ; the less likely that the emission level increases as emission tax increases.
A direct policy implication of Corollary 1 is that if C P G is reduced by any means, such as fast-tracking green patents, the less likely that this paradox occurs and the more e¤ective are emission taxes at inducing green innovation. This follows from the fact that the threshold^ 2 is decreasing in C P G ; by de…nition. 20
In the following section, we examine whether the results summarized in Proposition 1 and Corollary 1 carry over to the scenario with green consumers.
The Equilibrium with Green Consumers
In this section, we continue our analysis with the general model introduced in Section 2 with green consumers, that is, 0 < 1:
Second Stage: Monopoly Pricing
We begin with the second stage, and analyze the pricing strategy of the …rm. Assuming that the innovation has been patented, in the second period the …rm solves the following:
where the demand is given by (4). Due to the discontinuities in the demand function, depending on the chosen price, the …rm will face either all green and non-green consumers, some green consumers and all non-green consumers, or only non-green consumers. The only relevant cases for our analysis are those where non-green consumers and some green consumers consume, and only non-green consumers buy the good. Therefore, we will only consider a constellation of parameters such that the cases where demand is inelastic at 1 or at 0 are ruled out.
If only non-green consumers buy the good, the demand is (1 ) such that the …rm sets its price at v and, therefore, the pro…t is given by:
where the emission level is thus e = (1 ).
If some green conscious consumers and all non-green conscious consumers buy the good, the pro…t-maximizing price is given by:
we have that an increase in CP G must correspond to a decrease in^ 2: and the second order condition is satis…ed since @ 2 =@p 2 = 2 = < 0.
In order to get demand from both types of consumers, we need to ensure that p m (I G ) < v G or, equivalently, that > , where +v c (G+ ) > 0:
In order for this condition to be satis…ed for any , we assume that
so that for any < H , we have < 1.
From (8), it follows that the demand is given by:
For values of > , the demand function, evaluated at the price p m (I G ); is decreasing in the marginal cost, c, and is increasing in the valuation, v:
have that the demand is increasing in I G . As the investment in the green technology increases, the demand increases as the product becomes greener.
To ensure that some but not all green conscious consumers buy the product (and rule out the case of inelastic demand 1), we further assume that
Therefore, assumptions (A1) and (A2) ensure that the extreme cases of D = 0 and D = 1 are avoided, since these cases would lead to discontinuities. 21
By substituting (8) and (9) into (6) ; when both non-green and green conscious consumers buy, we obtain the net pro…t of the …rm in the second stage as the following:
2 1 More speci…cally, the condition H < (v c)=(G + ) implies that the least environmentally friendly consumer has a positive demand for the dirtiest good ensuring that D 6 = 0 for = 1, and together with (A2) ensures that D 6 = 0 for all > : Moreover, the condition L > (v c)=(G + ) implies that the most environmentally friendly consumer does not buy the cleanest good ensuring that D 6 = 1 for = 1: Also, L > (v c)=(G + ) is a su¢ cient condition to ensure that e G < G for all > : Thus, Assumptions (A1) and (A2) together ensure that G < e G < G:
Even if both types of consumers are willing to buy the good (i.e., for > ), the …rm can either choose to serve only non-green consumers and set its price at v; or to serve all types of consumers by setting the price (8). The …rm will choose to serve only non-green consumers if N G > m where N G is de…ned by (7) and m by (10). This is equivalent to having < 1
See Appendix 1 for details of the derivation of 1 . It is straightforward to show that 1 > as long as (A1) is satis…ed: Therefore, if the fraction of green consumers is small ( < ), only non-green consumers demand the product. However, even if green consumers are willing to buy the good, the …rm might set its price at v such that only non-green consumers will purchase.
Thus, for 2 [ ; 1 ], only non-green consumers buy as the price is too high for green consumers to buy. For 2 [ 1 ; 1], both types of consumers buy the good at the price given by (8).
To summarize, when 2 [ 1 ; 1], the …rm chooses the monopoly price (8) in order to serve all types of consumers. When 2 [0; 1 ], only non-green consumers buy the good at price v.
Thus, for 2 [ 1 ; 1]; from (9) it follows that for any I G ; the emission level of the …rm is given by:
Let G 1 G + + 1 :
The following Lemma follows directly from (12) (the proof is provided in Appendix 1).
Lemma 1 The emission level, e m (I G );
(i) is decreasing in the emission tax, ; and (ii) is decreasing in I G for 2 ( 1 ; G ]; and increasing in I G for 2 ( G ; 1]:
In the absence of many green-conscious consumers, i.e., 2 ( 1 ; G ]; we obtain the standard result that an increase in investment in green technology results in less emissions. However, the rate of decrease of emissions steadily reduces as increases (since @ 2 e m (I G )
until it becomes positive for > G : Thus, Lemma 1(ii) implies that private investment by …rms in green technologies may lead to more emissions if the fraction of green conscious consumers is su¢ ciently large, i.e., > G : This is because, from (9), we have that demand is increasing in I G since as the product becomes cleaner, the environmentally friendly consumers demand more of it. 22 Moreover, Lemma 1(i) states that regardless of the impact of I G on the emission level, an increase in the emission tax rate decreases the emission level. Lemma 1(i) and (ii) together imply that when …rms invest in green technologies in the presence of green consumers who increase their demand for cleaner products, it becomes necessary to implement environmental regulation, such as an emission tax to ensure a reduction in the emission level. Figure 2 illustrates, in more detail, the impact of increasing investment in green technology on emissions.
Figure 2
In Figure 2 , in Areas I and II, we have @e m (I G ) @I G < 0; and in Area III, we have @e m (I G ) @I G > 0:
Area I represents the combinations of and for which the monopolist chooses to serve only 2 2 This is reminiscent of the rebound e¤ect, as explained earlier in Footnote 9.
non-green conscious consumers by setting p = v. This occurs for 2 (0; 1 ). In fact, for 2 (0; ) only non-green conscious consumers demand the good, while for 2 ( ; 1 ), some green conscious consumers are willing to buy, but the …rm chooses to set a price that is too high for them to buy. In Area I, the emission level is given by: e m (I G ) = (1 );
and thus,
For > 1 ; the monopolist chooses p m and serves both green and non-green consumers (Areas II and III in Figure 2 ). The emission level in Areas II and III is given by (12) 
First Stage: Pro…t-Maximizing Investment
In the …rst stage of the game, the …rm chooses the investment level in green technology I G that solves the following problem:
where the pro…t m (I G ) is de…ned by (10) for 2 ( 1 ; 1]. 23 Let I m G be the solution of the unconstrained optimization problem (i.e., I m G = arg max m (I G ) I G ) such that it is the solution of the following …rst order condition:
We note that the left-hand side of equation (13) is positive such that (13) is satis…ed as long as Assumptions (A1) and (A2) hold (see Appendix 1 for details). The …rst term (i) of (13) captures the change in demand of green consumers as investment changes marginally, whereas the second term (ii) captures the change in demand of non-green consumers. The second term can push the investment level down since it can be negative. To obtain an interior maximum solution, we further assume that
such that the second order condition is satis…ed (see Appendix 1 for details).
The solution of the constrained problem is thus I m M axfI m G ; I P G g. Indeed, as long as the constraint is always satis…ed, we have I m G > I P G and thus the …rm chooses its optimal investment level. When the constraint binds, the …rm must invest I P G > I m G .
Policy Implications
Having solved for the equilibrium of the model, we now turn to analyzing the e¤ect of changes in emission tax and patent policies. In order to do so, we …rst de…ne "weak" and "strong" patentability requirements.
De…nition 1 A "weak" patentability requirement is de…ned to be I P G I m G for = 0; and a "strong" patentability requirement is de…ned to be I P G > I m G for all 0:
By De…nition 1, a strong patentability requirement means that no matter what the emission tax level, the unconstrained optimal investment level of the monopolist, I m G ; is always below the required investment level to obtain a patent, I P G . A weak patentability requirement means that in the absence of any emission tax, the monopolist naturally invests more than the minimum required to obtain a patent. However, I m G is decreasing with the tax level, 24 so that as the tax increases we may have I P G I m G . In what follows, we consider that the fraction of green conscious consumers is such that > 1 . When the patentability requirement is weak, we begin by focusing on the case where the …rm chooses to invest I m G in the …rst stage, patents its green innovation and sets the price (i) is increasing in the emission tax, ; and in G; for 2 ( 1 ; G ];
(ii) is decreasing in the emission tax, ; and in G; for 2 ( G ; 1]:
Lemma 2 follows directly from (13) (see Appendix 1 for details of the calculations): In the absence of many green conscious consumers, i.e., 2 ( 1 ; G ]; we obtain the standard result that an increase in emission tax induces greater investment in green technology. However, the rate of increase of investment steadily reduces as increases, until it becomes negative for > G : This is because by Lemma 1; an increase in I G would be accompanied by an increase in emissions for > G , and thereby, an increase in the tax bill facing the …rm. Thus, for > G ; the …rm chooses to decrease green investment when faced with a higher emission tax. Changes in G play a similar role to changes in in our model.
The intuition behind Lemma 2 is that while trying to lower the tax bill by increasing innovation, the …rm faces a trade-o¤ between lower emission per unit of good and higher demand.
The former e¤ect outweighs the latter when the fraction of green consumers is not too high, but
the opposite is true when the fraction of green consumers becomes too large.
For 2 ( G ; 1]; an implication of Lemma 2 is that I m G keeps falling as increases until we have I P G > I m G : Let~ denote that level of the tax rate where I m G = I P G : For >~ ; the …rm must invest more than I m G in order to satisfy the patentability requirement. That is, the investment level is given by I m M axfI m G ; I P G g. Thus, the equilibrium price is given by p = p m (I m ): We summarize this …nding in the following Lemma.
Lemma 3 If C P G < m (I G ) I G , the …rm (i) invests I m maxfI P G ; I m G g in the …rst period, patents its innovation and (ii) chooses the price p = p m (I m ) as de…ned by (8) in the second period.
The quantity sold and the emission level in equilibrium are given by: If I P G is larger, that is, the patentability requirement is strong as per De…nition 1, the …rm must invest I P G for any 0 in order to satisfy the patentability requirement and will also set a higher price p m (I P G ) > p m (I m G ). It will invest as long as m (I P G ) I P G C P G > 0.
Thus far, we have presented the case where the …rm invests in the green technology and patents it. However, the decision regarding whether to invest depends on the patenting cost,
If the patenting cost is relatively small (C P G < m (I P G ) I P G ), the …rm always invests, no matter how stringent the patent policy. If the patenting cost is very large, (C P G > m (I m G ) I m G ), the …rm never invests. For intermediate values of the patenting cost ( m (I P G ) I P G < C P G < m (I m G ) I m G ), a too stringent patentability requirement discourages the …rm from investing, whereas a less strict patentability requirement induces the …rm to invest. We summarize these …ndings in the following Lemma. If the conditions in terms of C P G ; as per Lemma 4; are not satis…ed, the …rm does not invest, such that Bertrand competition occurs in the second stage of the game with = H . In this case, the price is given by p c = c+ H , the demand is given by D(p c ) = (v c H (G+ ))= H +(1 ) and the emission level is given by:
Lemmas 2, 3 and 4 are summarized in Figures 3 and 4 
below. Using these Figures, we examine
whether the paradox that occurs in the benchmark case without green consumers carries over to the case with green consumers: …rst under a weak patentability requirement (Figure 3) , and then under a strong patentability requirement (Figure 4) . Figure 3 , it follows that, under a weak patentability requirement regime, for < 1 ; a su¢ ciently small increase in (a stronger environmental policy), reduces the emission level in equilibrium. A larger increase in to beyond 1 pushes the pro…t-maximizing investment level down to I P G in which case, in order to be able to patent the …rm cannot reduce its investment anymore and, thus, must invest at I P G . At this investment level, as increases further, the emission level decreases but at a slower rate. At even higher values of ; i.e., beyond 2 ; the …rm 2 6 Figure 3 illustrates the case for 2 ( G; 1]: For 2 ( 1; G]; at = 0 we have e m (I m G ) < e m (IP G) ; since decides not to patent, and thus not to invest, in which case the emission level goes up to the competitive level, e c as shown in Figure 3 . At a still higher tax rate, i.e., beyond 3 ; e c falls below the emission level that would be reached if the innovation had occurred, e m (I P G ). Thus, unlike in the benchmark case with only non-green consumers, the paradoxical result occurs only for an intermediate range of tax rates, 2 ( 2 ; 3 ). Holding constant C P G ; the paradox disappears by increasing tax rates beyond 3 which reduces the emission level to e c , despite the lack of innovation. At tax rates above 3 , we have e m (I P G ) > e c for the following reason. While in the competitive equilibrium, there is no innovation, if I P G were invested, demand from the green consumers would be higher, pushing up the emission level.
Proposition 2 The emission level, in the presence of green consumers, (i) decreases due to marginal increases in the tax rate at any 2 [0; 2 );
(ii) increases discretely due to an increase in the tax rate from any < 2 to any 2 ( 2 ; 3 );
(iii) and decreases due to an increase in the tax rate from any < 3 to any > 3 :
Proposition 2 generalizes the …ndings stated in Proposition 1 to the case with green consumers (see Appendix 1 for proof) with a caveat for very high tax rates. Comparing Proposition 1 and Proposition 2; it follows that for large emission tax levels, > 3 , an increase in the emission tax level is only e¤ective at reducing the emission level in the presence of green consumers.
We note that the threshold 2 is decreasing in C P G ; by de…nition: 27 This leads to the following Corollary.
Corollary 2 A su¢ cient reduction in the cost of patenting, C P G ;
(i) decreases the emission level for an intermediate range of tax rates, 2 ( 2 ; 3 );
(ii) increases the emission level for very high tax rates, > 3 :
tracking green patents) helps to reduce emission levels, and when it does not. As per Corollary 2(i), since the increase in emission occurs due to m (I m G ) I m G falling below C P G after an increase in beyond 2 ; this adverse impact could be avoided by decreasing C P G ; as in the benchmark case without green consumers. However, in the presence of green consumers and for tax rates higher than 3 , as per Proposition 2(iii), decreasing C P G increases the emission level from e c (which would occur without innovation if C P G were su¢ ciently high), to e m (I P G ) ; as shown in Figure 3 .
The same results carry over to the case with a strong patentability requirement such that I P G > I m G for all 0, as per De…nition 1. As shown in Figure 4 , the emission level decreases as increases, and the same mechanism applies as described above, except that the …rm is always constrained to invest I P G . Note that the thresholds 2 ; 3 and b are the same as in Figure   3 . In Figure 4 Next, we compare strict and weak patentability requirements in terms of their impact on emission levels.
Proposition 3 The emission level is (i) higher under a weak patentability requirement than under a strong patentability requirement for 2 ( 1 ; G ];
(ii) lower under a weak patentability requirement than under a strong patentability requirement for 2 ( G ; 1]:
Proposition 3 follows directly from Lemma 1; and has direct and important policy implications. When the fraction of green conscious consumers is su¢ ciently small, i.e., 2 ( 1 ; G ];
moving from a weak to a strong patentability requirement for green innovation, ceteris paribus, decreases the emission level. This corresponds to Areas I and II in Figure 2 . However, when the fraction of green conscious consumers is su¢ ciently large, i.e., 2 ( G ; 1]; moving from a weak to a strong patentability requirement for green innovation, ceteris paribus, increases the emission level, corresponding to Area III in Figure 2 . Therefore, for 2 ( G ; 1]; the stricter the patentability requirement, that is, the higher that I P G is raised above I m G ; the more urgent it becomes to increase the emission tax simultaneously in order to curb emissions.
Socially Optimal Investment
The socially optimal level of investment, given that the …rm sets the monopoly price in the second period, is the solution of M ax
and is denoted by I G . 29 The consumer surplus is given by:
We assume that taxes are a redistribution between consumers and producers. That is, taxes reduce pro…ts and are re-distributed in a lump sum way to consumers. Since m (IG); as de…ned by (10), denotes pro…ts net of taxes, we add the tax revenue, e(IG); back in the social welfare function, given by (15).
Thus, I G must satisfy dW (I G )=dI G = 0 or, equivalently,
Evaluated at I m G , the left-hand side of (16) above becomes
By Lemma 1, we have that de m (I G )=dI G < (>) 0 for < (>) G . Thus, the expression (17) is positive for > G and > 1 and for < G and < 1: The expression (17) may be negative for > G and < 1 and for < G and > 1: There exists a threshold e 1 > 1 such that for < G and > e 1 ; we have (17) < 0: There exists a threshold e 2 < 1 such that for > G and < e 2 ; we have (17) < 0: This leads to the following Proposition.
Proposition 4 (i) For 2 ( 1 ; G ] and e 1 ; I m G < I G (the …rm underinvests relative to the socially optimal level) and for > e 1 , I m G > I G (the …rm overinvests relative to the socially optimal level).
(ii) For 2 ( G ; 1] and e 2 ; I m G < I G (the …rm underinvests relative to the socially optimal level) and for < e 2 , I m G > I G (the …rm overinvests relative to the socially optimal level).
Proposition 4(i) states that as long as the fraction of green conscious consumers is su¢ ciently low, the …rm underinvests relative to the socially optimal level for a su¢ ciently low emission tax and overinvests for a su¢ ciently high emission tax. This is in line with much of the literature surrounding the Porter hypothesis which predicts that higher taxes induce more investment by …rms. However, the gap between the socially e¢ cient and privately optimal levels of investment steadily reduces as increases, until this result is reversed when the fraction of green conscious consumers is su¢ ciently high, as stated by Proposition 4(ii).
Duopoly
We have thus far assumed that once a patent has been granted for a green technology that reduces the emission-output ratio below the threshold P , the patented technology becomes a new technology standard for the industry which is enforced by regulators. This prevents other …rms from producing the good with the old dirty technology, and allows us to focus on the monopoly case in order to clearly isolate and identify the direct channel through which consumers'behaviour impacts innovation and the emission level. In this section, we relax this assumption and consider a scenario where the new green technology can coexist with the old dirty technology in a duopoly game. We show that the paradoxical result whereby an increase in emission tax increases the emission level still holds for a range of parameter values even after allowing …rms to behave strategically when setting prices.
In this section, we assume that Firm 1 produces a green product with an emission-output ratio given by G and price given by p G : Firm 2 produces a dirty product with an emissionoutput ratio given by H and price given by p H ; where H > G and p H < p G . That is, we allow Firm 1 to unilaterally invest in reducing . While all the details of the derivations of this duopoly model are provided in Appendix 2, in this section, we summarize our main …ndings within this duopoly setting.
A green conscious consumer has the following utility function: 
A non-green conscious consumer always buys the dirty product since it is cheaper, and has the following utility function:
v p H P (e) from buying the product P (e) from not buying
A green conscious consumer G buys the green product rather than the dirty product as long as the following condition holds:
that is, as long as G 2 p G p H H G ; G i : Also, a green conscious consumer buys the green product rather than not buying anything as long as v G G p G P (e) > P (e); that is, G < (p G v)= G : A non-green conscious consumer buys the dirty good as long as v p H .
Within this setting, the impact of increasing investment by Firm 1 on the emission level is illustrated by Figure 5 . the emission level increases in the investment level in green innovation (@e=@I G > 0). As the investment level increases, the emission of Firm 2 is reduced (as more consumers buy the cleaner product), but the emission of Firm 1 increases more than the decrease in the emission level of Firm 2. Thus, we illustrate that the key driving force behind the main results under monopoly carries over to the case of duopoly where a …rm can strategically choose the greenness of its product.
Moreover, our results in terms of emission levels are qualitatively similar to those summarized by Figures 3 and 4 as long as H is su¢ ciently large. First, in the case of Bertrand competition (if Firm 1 does not innovate, and both …rms produce the dirty product), we obtain the same equilibrium as in the monopoly case: the emission level is given by e c = (v c H (G + )) + H (1 ); which is decreasing with . We de…ne b to be the value of the tax for which e c = 0; as before. Then, we consider the case when the patenting constraint binds and Firm 1 must invest I P G (> I G ) in order to patent its innovation. In this case, the emission levels are, thus, given by e G (I P G ) = P D G ( ) and e H (I P G ) = H D H ( ), and both of them are decreasing with the tax, ; as @e G =@ = P @D G =@ < 0 and @e H =@ = H @D H =@ < 0. Finally, we show that in the case where the patenting constraint is non-binding, as long as H > 2 G ; the total emission level is decreasing with the tax, @e( )=@ < 0. Evaluated at = 0, e(I G ) < e c , so that the emission levels in the case of our duopoly setting are similar to the monopoly case as represented in Figures 3 and 4 . In particular, we retrieve the paradoxical result where an increase in leads to a increase in emission level for 2 ( 2 ; 3 ). However, in the duopoly case, whether 3 is less that b is ambiguous and depends on the values of P and H .
Conclusion
In this paper, we develop a theoretical framework to investigate the impact of patent policies and emission taxes on green innovation and emissions in the presence of environmentally friendly consumers. We analyze the e¤ect of changing patentability requirements and patenting costs when a …rm may invest in a green innovation, which reduces the emission output ratio.
We show that, in the absence of green consumers, the introduction of patents may result in a paradoxical result whereby increasing the emission tax beyond a certain threshold leads to a discrete increase in the emission level, which may be avoided by reducing the patenting cost, e.g., by fast-tracking green patents. In the presence of green consumers, this paradox is restricted to an intermediate range of tax rates. This is because, at very high tax rates, the emission level in the competitive equilibrium that occurs in the absence of innovation, is lower than that with innovation. Thus, a lower emission level is reached despite a tax increase that makes the innovation unpro…table. It follows that, at su¢ ciently high tax rates, reducing patenting costs in order to induce innovation ends up increasing the emission level in the presence of green consumers.
Moreover, we show that a stricter patentability requirement is only e¤ective at reducing emissions as long as the fraction of green consumers is su¢ ciently small. We also …nd that investment in green technologies reduces emissions only if the fraction of green consumers is suf-…ciently small, and that the magnitude of this e¤ect decreases as the fraction of green consumers increases. If the fraction of green consumers increases beyond a certain threshold, investment in green technologies results in more emissions. To prevent this perverse outcome, policy makers might consider imposing a capacity constraint on …rms as they invest more in green innovation in the presence of green consumers. For a su¢ ciently small fraction of green consumers, we retrieve the expected result found in much of the literature surrounding the Porter hypothesis that a higher emission tax increases green investment. However, this result is reversed if the fraction of green consumers rises to a level such that investment in green technologies results in more emissions. Finally, we show that as long as the fraction of green consumers is su¢ ciently low, the …rm underinvests relative to the socially optimal level for a su¢ ciently low emission tax and overinvests for a su¢ ciently high emission tax. However, the gap between the socially e¢ cient and privately optimal levels of investment steadily reduces as this fraction increases, until this result is reversed when the fraction of green consumers is su¢ ciently high.
To summarize, this paper determined the conditions under which reducing patenting costs and making patentability requirements stricter are e¤ective at inducing green innovation and thereby reducing emissions. These patent policy tools were shown to become less e¤ective as society becomes more environmentally friendly. Thus, further research seems warranted regarding the policies to reduce emissions through green innovation, and also regarding the type of information to distribute to consumers. In particular, if consumers reward marginal reductions in emission-ouput ratios of production processes by increasing their demand for the …nal product, this may inhibit the traditional patent policy tools from working as expected. At the same time, increasing emission taxes to very high levels seem more e¤ective in the presence of green consumers, while increasing emission taxes may be harmful for the environment in the absence of green consumers. These are some of the policy implications generated in our framework.
As implied by the above summary of our …ndings, this paper generates a number of potentially testable hypotheses, each of which depends on the fraction of green consumers, :
There are a few indices that measure the environmental friendliness of consumers across coun-tries, such as Greendex (computed by National Geographic) and GlobeScan, 31 which may be used in conjunction with data on the relevant variables, such as emission and green investment levels and patenting costs, to test the hypotheses generated by the Lemmas and Propositions in this paper. Instead of using green consumer indices, another possible approach to testing our hypotheses might be the following two step procedure. First, the "rebound-like" e¤ect as explained in Footnote 9, whereby the demand of a product increases the cleaner it becomes, would have to be estimated for di¤erent goods/regions. This would then act as a proxy for :
Second, the interaction of this "rebound-like" e¤ect with the relevant variables would need to be estimated. Testing the above hypotheses is beyond the scope of this paper, and we leave the The First Order Condition (FOC) in the …rst stage is given by:
Moreover, @e @ = @ @I @I N G @ < 0: When = 0; we have I N G = 0 with = H ; with decreasing in for I N G > 0: At =^ 1 ;
we have I N G = P : Thus, for a su¢ ciently low tax rate, that is, 2 [0;^ 1 ); the …rm invests the minimum amount required to obtain a patent, that is, P . For 1 2 [^ 1 ;^ 2 ), the …rm has an incentive to invest more than this minimum amount since I N G < P . We note that the …rm only invests as long as v c
which implies that It follows that for >^ 2 , the …rm does not invest and Bertrand competition results in emission level given by e c = H :
Monopoly Pricing
The …rm chooses p m as de…ned by (8) instead of v if the pro…t (10) is higher than the pro…t (7), i.e., m > (v) or, equivalently,
Let us denote a = v c and b = 1 . The inequality can be rewritten as [a G+b] 2 > 4ba
Thus, the discriminant of the quadratic equation is = 4(a + G) 2 4(a G) 2 = 16a G > 0, and the two roots are
Therefore, for values of b such that b < b 0 and b > b 00 inequality (22) is satis…ed. In terms of ;
we obtain that this inequality is satis…ed as long as > 1 and < 2 with
We show that 2 < , so that the …rm will choose the monopoly price (8) if > 1 .
Proof of Lemma 1
From (12), we have @e m (I G ) @ = 2 < 0; which results in Lemma 1(i): The derivative of e m (I G )
with respect to I G is given by:
where d =dI G < 0. Thus, @e m (I G )=@I G < (>) 0 for < (>) G ; which results in Lemma 1(ii).
Second Order Condition
In the …rst period, the …rm chooses the optimal investment that satis…es
where the pro…t m (I G ) is de…ned by (10). Let I m G be the solution of the unconstrained optimization program (i.e., I m G = arg max m (I G ) I G ) such that it is solution of (13). Notice that the expression
is strictly concave for all 0 < < 1; with two roots given by~ = v c+ +G + and = c v+ +G + > 1: It can be shown that~ < < G < 1 < . Therefore, the left-hand side of equation (13) is positive such that (13) is satis…ed.
The Second Order Condition (SOC) is satis…ed as long as
Using the First Order Condition (13) we can write
that we plug into the SOC to obtain a local condition which is Assumption (A3). If this local condition is satis…ed, locally the pro…t function is concave.
Comparative Statics
Lemma 5 For a weak patentability requirement, I m G is decreasing in c, and increasing in v.
Lemma 5 follows directly from (13) (see below for details of the calculations). As the marginal cost of production, c; increases, the pro…tability of the product decreases, which explains why …rms have less incentive to invest in the green technology. As v increases, demand increases, leading to an increase in I m G :
Proofs of Lemmas 2 and 5
In order to derive the relevant comparative statics results on I m G ; it is useful to de…ne the following:
where y may represent any of the exogenously given parameters, that is, y 2 f ; c; v; G; g. By totally di¤erentiating (13), we have the following dI m G dy = @F @y @F @I G
:
Since we have assumed the existence of an interior solution, it follows that a maximum is reached at I m G : This implies that @F @I G 0, and thus sign dI m G dy = sign @F @y :
For y 2 f ; c; v; G; g, we have @F @ = @F @G = 0 2 ( ( + G) (1 )) < 0;
if and only if G .
The following table summarizes the above comparative statics results. 
The emission level when the price is equal to marginal cost is given by equation (14) 
Proof of Lemma 4
As long as I P G I m G , i.e., the patentability requirement is weak, and C P G < m (I m G ) I m G ; it is pro…table to invest. If I P G > I m G for all , i.e., the patentability requirement is strong, then unless C P G < m (I P G ) I P G < m (I m G ) I m G ; it is not pro…table to invest.
Proof of Proposition 2
The emission level, e m (I m ); is decreasing in since
For any 2 >~ ; the relevant emission level is e m (I P G ) since we have that I P G > I m G for this range of . If I m = I P G , the second term of (23) is null, and we have that de m =d = (I m )=2 < 0.
For any 1 <~ ; the relevant emission level is e m (I m G ) since we have that I P G I m G for this range of . If I m = I m G , the second term of (23) is also negative since @e m =@I m < (>) 0 for < (>) G by Lemma 1; and @I m =@ > (<) 0 for < (>) G by Lemma 2. It follows that @e m (I m G ) @ > @e m (I P G ) @ : This completes the proof of Proposition 3(i). An increase in from either 1 or 2 to 3 causes m (I m G ) I m G to fall below C P G such that it becomes unpro…table for the …rm to invest in the green technology, as per Proposition 2. This causes the emission level to rise from e m (I m ) to e c as given by (14) : This completes the proof of Proposition 3(ii).
Socially Optimal Investment
The total welfare is
where m (I G ) is de…ned by (10) and the consumer surplus is
Therefore, the total welfare can be written as
The derivative of the total welfare gives
Evaluated at I m G , it becomes expression (14) or
It is positive for > G and > 1 and for < G and < 1: There exists a threshold e 1 > 1 such that for < G and > e 1 ; we have (17) < 0: There exists a threshold e 2 < 1 such that for > G and < e 2 ; we have (17) < 0:
Appendix 2 -Duopoly Case
Consider a duopoly case in which one of the …rms, Firm 1, gets a patent for the green technology it has discovered, while the other …rm, Firm 2, still produces its dirty product. Firm 1 produces a green product, the emission-output ratio of which is given by (I G ) = G at price p G , and Firm 2 produces the dirty product, the emission-output ratio of which is given by H at price
The timing is similar to the monopoly case: in the …rst stage of the game, Firm 1 decides the level of investment in the green technology, I G . Once the innovation has been discovered, Firm 1 decides whether to patent it. In the second stage, both …rms choose their prices simultaneously.
The patent prevents Firm 2 from producing with the cleaner technology and, thus, Firm 2 can only use the dirty technology.
Unlike the monopoly case, there are now two demand functions: one for the green product and one for the dirty product. A green conscious consumer has the following utility function: ; G]: Also, a green conscious consumer buys the green product rather than not buying anything as long as v G G p G P (e) > P (e); that is, G < (p G v)= G : A non-green consumer buys the dirty good as long as v p H .
We verify that
To obtain positive demands for both products, we check that
Lastly, we need to check that p
Both demands evaluated at prices (p G ; p H ) are, thus, given by:
and
The demand for the dirty product decreases with the investment level in green technology, I G ;
as
However, the demand for the green good decreases with the investment level, I G ; only if < 5 ( G ), but increases with the investment level for > 5 ( G ); where
where 5 ( G ) < 4 (I G ): The response of demand to marginal changes in investment is given by:
If the fraction of green conscious consumers, , is large enough, an increase in the investment level in green technology increases the demand for the green product.
The emission from the dirty producer is given by e H = H D H (p G ; p H ), which is always decreasing with the investment level, I G ; as @e H @I G = H 0 G (I G ) v c 2(G+ 1 ) H (4 H G (I G )) 2 < 0:
As Firm 1 invests in cleaner technology, the emission of the dirty product will be reduced as the demand decreases.
The emission from the green producer is given by e G = G (I G )D G (I G ): As the investment level increases, the emission level increases if > where 2 H 2(G+ +1) H (v c) ;
We can also derive the total emission level given by e = e H + e G = H D H + G (I)D G (I), which is decreasing in as @e @ = H (2 H + G (I)) 4 H G (I)
< 0:
For a given investment level, as increases, the total emission level decreases. However, when we account for the pro…t-maximizing investment level, the e¤ect of an increase of investment on the emission level can be decomposed as follows:
:
Thus, an increase in the investment level decreases the emission level of Firm 2, but may increase or decrease the emission level of Firm 1. Formally, we have that @e @I G = 0 G 3 H (4 H G ) 2 ( ((v c) 2(G + + 1) H ) + 2 H ); so that @e=@I G > 0 if > . We summarize these …ndings in the following Figure, which is the same as Figure 5 in the paper. the emission level increases in the investment level in green innovation (@e=@I G > 0). As the investment level increases, the emission of Firm 2 is reduced (as more consumers buy the cleaner product), but the emission of Firm 1 increases more than the decrease in the emission level of Firm 2.
Pro…t-Maximizing Investment
At the outset, Firm 1 will choose I G that solves the following problem: Let I D ( ) denote the solution of this maximization problem, which is either I P G (the minimum investment needed to obtain a patent) or I G (if it is larger than I P G ). Note that I G is the unconstrained pro…t-maximizing investment level, which satis…es the following …rst order condition: 
Let F (I G ; ) represent this …rst order condition, (26). The solution I G is a function of and, thus, by totally di¤erentiating F (:) and rearranging the terms, we can obtain the sign of @I G =@ ;
where 3 < b .
Evaluated at = 0, the total emission level is e P G ( = 0) = P D G (0) + H D H (0), which is smaller than e c ( = 0) if (v c) 2 H (G + 1) + 2 H > 0:
When the patenting constraint does not bind, Firm 1 chooses I G that satis…es (26). In that case, the equilibrium emission level as a function of is given by: e( ) = e H ( ) + e G ( ) = H D H (I G ( ); ) + G (I G ( ))D G (I G ( ); ):
Note that the demands are de…ned by (25) and (24) when Firm 1 chooses the pro…t-maximizing level of investment I G , which means that I G is higher than the minimum requirement to obtain a patent I P G .
First, we consider the impact of on the emission level of Firm 2, e H ( );
where @D H =@ < 0 and @D H =@I G < 0. Thus, if @I G =@ > 0, which occurs when the fraction of green conscious consumers is not large, < e , then an increase in the tax reduces the emission level of Firm 2, @e H =@ < 0. However, if the fraction of green conscious consumers is large enough, > e , we have @I G =@ < 0, which implies that the impact of an increase of the tax on the emission level is ambiguous. If we calculate @D H @I G @I G @ + @D H @ ; we obtain the following:
; which is higher than 1 for 0
The e¤ect of an increase of the tax on the emission level of Firm 1, e G ( ) = G (I D G ( ))D G (I D G ( ); ), is determined by
: @e G ( )=@ < 0. We also calculate that e > 5 ( G ) if (4 H G ) 2 G + 4 H ( H 2 G ) > 0, or if H > 2 G . Therefore, as long as H > 2 G the total emission level is decreasing with the tax, @e( )=@ < 0. Evaluated at = 0, e(I) < e c , so that the emission level in the case of a duopoly is similar to the monopoly case as represented in Figures 3 and 4. 
